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Would the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent life (ETI) conflict in any way with Christian 
belief? We identify six areas of potential conflict. If there be no conflict in any of these 
areas—and we argue ultimately there is not—we are confident in declaring that there is no 
conflict, period. This conclusion underwrites the integrity of theological explorations into the 






Our galaxy is extremely vast. It takes approximately 100,000 years for light to cross from one 
side to the other. Yet there are billions of other galaxies besides our own. That’s right—
billions. And so far, some 4,000 exoplanets (planets that orbit a star outside of our own 
galaxy) have been discovered in them, and there are likely far more. As Jennifer Wiseman 
points out, since on average every star has a planet, we should expect billions of more planets 
to exist—again, billions.1 As the number of potentially habitable exoplanets discovered 
increases, so too does the likelihood that one or more plays host to extraterrestrial intelligent 
life (ETI). Aside from such likelihood estimates based on the size and scale of the universe,2 
there are a number of arguments, old and new, for the conclusion that theism actually 
increases the likelihood of there being ETI.3 We mention such arguments en pessant, but will 
not assess them here. Rather, we will assume for the sake of argument that ETI exist. 
Would the existence of ETI conflict in any way with Christian belief? Before we attempt 
an answer to this question, we must first say a bit about what we mean by “Christian belief,” 
and, for that matter, “conflict.” By the former we mean the broad intersection of beliefs that, 
traditionally, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant believers alike would be happy to raise their 
glass to: that there is one God who is three persons, perfect in knowledge, power, and 
goodness, responsible for the creation and sustenance of the universe, and whose character is 
specially revealed in the Bible, in particular, the New Testament, the central message of 
which is that while we are estranged from God by sin, God, in His grace and mercy, extended 
 
1 See Wiseman (2018), chapter seven.  
2 I (CAM) don’t find the “sheer numbers” argument very compelling for several reasons. First, the numbers 
themselves can be questioned. Physics and astronomy professor Larry Molnar tells me that the definition of 
“habitable planet” is often broadened in ways that inflate their number. More sober estimates imply Earth is 
rare, but probably not unique. Second, as John Barrow and Frank Tipler note, astrophysicists and astronomers 
are much more optimistic about the existence of ETI than are evolutionary biologists. After surveying the 
various physiological prerequisites for the evolution of intelligent species like ourselves, they report “[f]or the 
above reasons, and many others which we omit for reasons of space, there has developed a general consensus 
among evolutionists that the evolution of intelligent life, comparable in information-processing ability to that of 
Homo sapiens, is so improbable that it is unlikely to have occurred on any other planet in the entire visible 
universe.” See Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 133. Barrow and Tipler themselves go on to argue in similar 
fashion against the existence of ETI based on the improbability of the requisite evolutionary steps taking place 
elsewhere before an extinction event occurs (idem., pp. 561-570), in addition to other considerations based on 
the thought that if ETI did exist, they probably would have made their existence known by now (idem., pp. 
576ff). Thus, in the end, I think the best reasons for thinking there are ETI are, ironically, theological.  
3 Most of these arguments are based on certain alleged axiological implications of theism. For a historical 
sampling of such arguments, see Weintraub (2014), ch. 2. For a contemporary defense, see the relevant essays in 
Kraay (2015), especially Robin Collins’. 
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to us an offer of forgiveness and reconciliation through the sacrificial death and triumphant 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, the incarnate second person of the Trinity, and all those who 
accept that offer will enter eternal communion with God, readied in this life by the 
sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity. 
Like Christian belief, we mean something broad and ecumenical by “conflict.” There are 
varieties of conflict: logical inconsistency, incompatibility with known truths or one’s beliefs, 
probabilistic disconfirmation, unnatural or clunky fit with a dataset, and more. Indeed, as we 
will argue, there may well be a kind of conflict between Christian belief and the existence of 
ETI, what we call narrative tension. We shall come to that in due course. The present point is 
that we are interested in any sort of conflict between Christian belief, as outlined above, and 
the existence of ETI. We therefore work through, in systematic fashion, six areas of potential 
conflict that cover the high points of Christian belief: incompatibility with theism, the 
Christian scriptures, central Christian doctrines, and Christian tradition; conflict to the extent 
that ETI exacerbates the problem of evil, and conflict with the Christian narrative. Beyond 
these, we know of no other area of potential conflict. If there be no conflict in any of these 
areas—and we argue ultimately there is not—we are confident in declaring that there is no 
conflict, period, or at least that the onus is on those who allege conflict to demonstrate as 
much. This conclusion, we hope, will help Christians intellectually prepare for the possibility 
of there being ETI, and underwrites the integrity of theological explorations into it. 
 
1. Conflict with Theism 
 
Quite clearly, if the existence of ETI implied that God does not exist, ETI would pose a 
problem for Christian belief. So is there any reason to think the existence of ETI is 
incompatible with theism generally, the view that there is a God—a supernatural personal 
being who is perfect in knowledge, power, and goodness? If so, we aren’t aware of any. That 
is, we aren’t aware of any valid, nonenthymematic arguments that have as a premise  
 




(C) God does not exist. 
 
On the contrary, we are aware of dozens of valid, nonenthymematic arguments that take as 
premises perfectly general metaphysical propositions which conclude with the complement 
of (C), propositions which in no way seem to conflict with (1).  
But perhaps we are wrong. Perhaps there are propositions entailed by (1) that should 
make us suspicious of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or renders it dubious that (∀x)[◇☐ 
(∃x) ⊃ ☐(∃x)]. Logical space is a big place—much bigger than physical space, even. Yet it 
seems to us that ex nihilo nihil fit would be just as true on Kepler-186f as it is here on Earth. 
Should we encounter a naïvely secular lot of ETIs on Kepler-186f, we see nothing that would 
bar us from asking what’s wrong with the kalam cosmological argument (though we would 
wonder just how intelligent they are if their response is “Well, then who caused God?”). 
Alternatively, it is quite conceivable that there be some impressively cerebral ETIs that pity 
us for the primitive state of our natural theology, having developed much flashier proofs of 
God’s existence than we have. Such proofs would be exciting, if only comprehendible by the 
Alexander Prusses among us.  
The existence of ETI might force us to revise some arguments for theism, however. We 
have in mind a particular version of the design argument popularized by the book, and 
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accompanying film, The Privileged Planet. According to this argument, the Earth is an 
exceedingly rare planet—a so-called Goldilocks planet—satisfying numerous highly unlikely 
conditions that make it uniquely suited for a species like ourselves. For example, a 
Goldilocks planet can’t be too far away from a star, nor can it be too close. Similarly, the 
planet must have ideal quantities of oxygen and water, and not be too big or too small. If our 
planet really is the only Goldilocks planet, it would be special indeed—so special, in fact, as 
to be highly suggestive of design. But if countless ETI exist, there would be large numbers of 
Goldilocks planets, making the odds of their existence not so impressive. Thus, whatever 
other virtues the Privileged Planet argument may have,4 perhaps large numbers of Goldilocks 
planets would weaken a design inference based just on the sheer improbability of their 
existence.5 
So be it. Not every theistic argument has to be a good one. That said, it should be pointed 
out that the existence of a plenitude of Goldilocks planets in no way discredits fine-tuning 
arguments (FTAs) for the existence of God. There is little room for adjustments with respect 
to the conditions that need to be in place for the universe as a whole to be suitable for 
intelligent life. For example, if the mass of the fundamental particles that make up our 
universe were different, the universe wouldn’t be able to form complex molecules on which 
intelligent life depends.6 Even if we kept the mass of these particles the same, but adjusted 
the laws that govern these particles’ motion or change, life in the universe would still be 
physically impossible.7 Again, we can imagine those impressively cerebral ETIs pointing to 
these same features of the universe in FTAs of their own, perhaps alongside other, even more 
exquisite instances of fine-tuning discovered by their technologically advanced instruments. 
We conclude that the existence of ETI poses no special problem for theism generally, 
although we may have to revise or abandon a theistic argument or two. Some, however, think 
that the discovery of ETI would undermine the world’s religions. Jill Tarter, former director 
of the Center for SETI, for instance, thinks that were ETI to make their existence known to 
us, we would abandon our religious beliefs and adopt whatever they believe, since they 
would likely be the intellectually and technologically superior species. Physicist Paul Davies 
thinks the existence of ETI “would have a profound impact on religion, shattering completely 
 
4 Being hospitable to life is just one (albeit crucial) feature suggestive of design. There might other features 
suggestive of design as well, such as aesthetic features. 
5 We say “perhaps” because we think the success of the Privileged Planet argument has less to do with the 
relative scarcity of Goldilocks planets as it does the relevant background information for weighing the design 
hypothesis against its competitors. To illustrate, suppose you’ve just moved to a windy area where lots of things 
frequently get blown onto people’s doorsteps—leaves, branches, dandelions, trash, etc. One day you find a rose 
on your doorstep. You entertain three possible hypotheses to explain its being there, not knowing how common 
roses are in the area: the rose was placed there by an admirer (call this A), roses are common and it blew there 
by chance (C&C), and roses are uncommon and it blew there by chance (U&C). These are roughly analogous to 
the three hypotheses proffered to explain life on Earth: divine design (D), naturalism and it wasn’t improbable 
(N&P), and naturalism and it was exceedingly improbable (N&I). In the rose example, we can vary two things: 
the number of roses on your doorstep and the number of roses on other doorsteps. If we add more roses to your 
doorstep, that confirms A over C&C and U&C—a dozen roses isn’t much less likely on A, but a lot less likely 
on C&C or U&C. On the other hand, if you discover that there are roses on other doorsteps, then that confirms 
C&C over A and U&C. It suggests there are lots of roses being blown about by the wind, making the one on 
your doorstep not so surprising. In the same way, there being lots of Goldilocks planets with ETI would confirm 
both D and N&P over N&I. Whether it confirms D simpliciter will depend on the initial probabilities of these 
alternatives, and how probable they make ETI. We thank a referee for encouraging us to think more about this, 
and Nevin Climenhaga for discussion on how the Privileged Planet argument is best understood 
probabilistically.  
6 Lewis and Barnes (2016), p. 63. 
7 Ibid., p. 93. 
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the traditional perspective of God’s special relationship with man.”8 Insofar as Tarter and 
Davies are simply conjecturing on the psychological impact that discovering ETI would have 
on religious believers, we do not necessarily disagree. In our experience of talking with 
fellow believing friends and family, many find the prospect of there being ETI disturbing, if 
not a challenge to their faith. In fact, one 2005 survey found that religious devotion is 
correlated with skepticism about the existence of ETI: the more devoted, the more skeptical.9 
What interests us, however, is not whether discovering ETI would have a psychological 
impact inimical to religious belief generally, but whether such an impact would be 
philosophically and theologically justified for Christians. We argue not. 
 
2. Conflict with Scripture 
 
If Christianity’s sacred scriptures taught that there is no ETI, and there is in fact ETI, there’d 
be conflict between Christian belief and the existence of ETI to the extent that one’s view of 
scriptural inspiration doesn’t allow for such a discrepancy.10 But, it hardly needs to be said 
that scripture teaches no such thing, so entertaining this counterfactual is of little interest to 
us. With due caution reserved, and ignorance confessed, over the meaning of those 
mysterious passages referring to otherworldly beasts and creatures, we regard any 
interpretation of scripture that purports to be a direct pronouncement on the existence of ETI 
as hokey, frankly. We cringe at the thought of what desperate Biblical eisegesis would follow 
confirmation of ETI. The reality is that the Christian scriptures are chiefly about God’s 
relationship to man. At the risk of taking a popular analogy too far, it would be odd, to say 
the least, for a man to mention that there have been others in a love letter to his wife. That is a 
conversation for a different time and forum. Scripture’s silence on the matter should therefore 
be expected. If there is no direct conflict in letter between the Christian scriptures and the 
existence of ETI, might there be indirect conflict with the spirit of the Christian scriptures as 
embodied in Christian doctrines? 
 
3. Conflict with Doctrine 
 
The existence of ETI, and what implications that might have for Christian doctrine, has been 
a topic of increased interest among theologians.11 Particular focus has been on the 
interconnected doctrines of the fall, incarnation, and atonement, those being the central 
events of the gospel. Few, however, seem to think there would be any conflict between the 
existence of ETI and these doctrines, and much fewer still attempt to articulate what a 
conflict might look like. This is what we shall do, with some help from Thomas Paine. 
According to Paine, those who don’t see a conflict between these doctrines and the 
existence of ETI simply haven’t thought enough about the matter. He writes: 
 
[T]o believe that God created a plurality of worlds, at least as numerous as what we call 
stars, renders the Christian system of faith at once little and ridiculous and scatters it in 
the mind like feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same 
 
8 See quotations in Peters (2018), pp. 184-185. If Tarter is right that we’d follow ETI in what they believe, 
imagine the boon for faith there would be if they turned out to be theists! 
9 Cited in Peters (2018), p. 185. 
10 We acknowledge a plethora of viable models for understanding scriptural inspiration, but those which allow 
for errors in what is intended to be taught are not among them. That said, even if such an error were discovered, 
we’d be forced to revise our understanding of inspiration, or perhaps what texts are genuinely inspired, not 
whether God exists, or whether Jesus vouchsafed his promise of salvation by rising from the dead.  
11 For recent treatments by theologians, see O’Meara (2012), Vainio (2018), and the collection of essays in 
Peters (2018).  
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mind, and he who thinks that he believes both, has thought but little of either. …  From 
whence, then, could arise the solitary and strange conceit that the Almighty, who had 
millions of worlds equally dependent on his protection, should quit the care of all the rest, 
and come to die in our world, because, they say, one man and one woman had eaten an 
apple? And, on the other hand, are we to suppose that every world in the boundless 
creation had an Eve, an apple, a serpent, and a redeemer? In this case, the person who is 
irreverently called the Son of God, and sometimes God himself, would have nothing else 
to do than to travel from world to world, in an endless succession of deaths, with scarcely 
a momentary interval of life.12 
 
The main argument here, once extracted from Paine’s characteristically colorful prose, 
actually pinpoints several potential areas of conflict between the existence of ETI and the 
doctrines of the fall, incarnation, and atonement. As we see it, the argument takes the form of 
a reductio against the conjunction of Christianity (comprised of these doctrines) and the 
existence of ETI, proceeding via a dilemma where either horn encounters an absurdity. So 
understood, the argument can be outlined as follows: 
 
(1) If Christianity is true and there is ETI, then either only humanity falls, or all 
intelligent life falls. 
(2) But it’s absurd to think that either only humanity falls, or that all intelligent life falls. 
(3) Therefore, it’s false that Christianity is true and there is ETI. 
 
The first horn is absurd because, Paine tells us, it would require God to abandon all other 
intelligent life in the universe to come rescue humanity via the incarnation and the atonement. 
The second horn runs into an absurdity at the other extreme, requiring God to undertake 
incarnation and atonement events everywhere there is intelligent life, which he thinks would 
be “at least as numerous as what we call stars.” What are we to make of this argument?  
It should first be pointed out that the conclusion only follows on the assumption that the 
relevant notion of absurdity means either “impossible,” “false,” or “implied to be false by 
Christian doctrine.” Otherwise, all Paine can conclude from (1) and (2) is that the antecedent 
of (1) entails an absurdity that is entirely consistent with what Christianity supposes is true. 
Were that Paine’s conclusion, the Christian can invite comparison with similar epistemic 
situations that we nonetheless accept. He might, for instance, reflect on the absurdity of being 
younger than one’s own daughter, a possible consequence of general relativity dramatized to 
great effect in Christopher Nolan’s film Interstellar. 
Second, Paine seems to assume that the incarnation is incompatible with omnipresence. 
The absurdity of the first horn, where only humanity falls, recall, would force God to “quit 
the care” of the rest of His creatures to rescue humanity via incarnation and atonement 
events. Paine therefore seems to think that prior to becoming incarnate on Earth, God could 
be omnipresent at all worlds containing intelligent life, providing the providential care they 
need. But this changes post incarnation. Why? Perhaps the idea is that by taking on a body, 
God thereby takes on the spatiotemporal limitations of having a body, such as not being able 
to occupy more than one spatiotemporal location at once. That this is Paine’s idea is 
supported by his reasoning against the second horn, where he imagines Jesus absurdly 
traveling from one fallen world to the next. 
 
12 Paine, (A), p. 42, 49. According to Richard Gale, the twentieth-century astrophysicist E. A. Milne similarly 
wondered whether ETI would render Christ and his crucifixion “a traveling tent show, playing one-night stands 
from one world to the next.” Gale must have been referring to Milne’s 1950 Cadbury Lectures, published as 
Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God. Sadly, this title is out of print; the cheapest copy on Amazon 
is going for a modest $768.57. 
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In response, we simply fail to see the problem here. We agree with Aquinas (ST I q8 a.3) 
and others that omnipresence can be understood in terms of God’s omniscience and 
omnipotence, where S is omnipresent, let’s say, just in case S is immediately aware of and 
can causally act at any point in space.13 So understood, having perfect knowledge of and the 
ability to control a particular human body would be a rather small subset of God’s total 
knowledge and power. We thus see no reason at all to think by virtue of becoming incarnate 
in one world, God’s knowledge and power would no longer extend to other worlds, including 
those containing intelligent life. Perhaps Paine has more general philosophical objections to 
the incarnation, such as how it’s possible to be truly divine (omniscient, omnipotent) and 
truly human (ignorant, impotent). We welcome and are prepared for those objections, but the 
existence of ETI becomes a vestigial part of the argument in that case. 
Beyond these points, the rest of what we will say about Paine’s argument generalizes to 
other arguments from these Christian doctrines for a conclusion like (3). In particular, Paine 
makes three key assumptions, one or more of which we think will be made in any argument 
for the conclusion that the existence of ETI is incompatible with the Christian doctrines of the 
fall, incarnation, and atonement.14 The assumptions are:  
 
A1. All intelligent life would be fallen and need to be saved.  
A2. All fallen intelligent life is saved only via incarnation. 
A3. There cannot be multiple incarnations. 
 
We will now consider whether these three assumptions are ones orthodox Christians need 
accept, or whether they can be reasonably denied. If the latter, arguments for a conclusion 
like (3) that appeal to them will be unsuccessful. Beginning with the first, then: 
 
A1. All intelligent life would fall and need to be saved. 
 
We think most Christians would be inclined to accept A1. The fall, as it is commonly thought 
of, is a single event—whether initiated by humans or by insubordinate angels some time 
immemorial—whose effect rippled throughout the entire cosmos. A plain reading of scripture 
certainly suggests as much, such as when the Apostle Paul says “the creation was subjected 
to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that 
the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the freedom 
and glory of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in 
the pains of childbirth right up to the present time” (Rom. 8:20-22). 
But we must be careful here. Even if it is true that the fall is a unique, singular event of 
cosmic consequence, that does not entail that all ETI has fallen, that is, rebelled against God 
and need to be saved. Why cannot there be unfallen alien creatures living in a fallen creation? 
Such is the scenario imagined by C. S. Lewis in his The Cosmic Trilogy. In the first volume, 
Out of the Silent Planet, there exist several intelligent alien races on Mars, all living in 
harmony, showing no indication of being fallen. They recite poetry, learn languages, 
demonstrate altruism, and are unconditionally devoted to Maleldil—their name for God. In 
the second volume, Perelandra, Lewis imagines an unfallen Adam and Eve-like pair on 
Venus in direct communion with Maleldil. In both cases, it is humans who disrupt these 
Edenic worlds, having come from the only planet where Maleldil was rejected as its ruler. So 
even if we think of the fall as a singular event of cosmic scope—which we grant for the sake 
 
13 For explication and defense of this understanding of omnipresence, see Swinburne (2016), ch. 7. 
14 Paine assumes more than just the three key assumptions we highlight, such as that if ETI exist, they exist in 
great number, but we don’t think the other assumptions are relevant to other, stronger arguments for (3). 
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of argument—that need not imply, as A1 has it, that all ETI is alienated from God as we are, 
requiring salvation. 
A1 would follow, however, from a suitably tweaked version of the Reformed doctrine of 
total depravity. Suppose instead we take our inspiration from an appropriated version of 
Alvin Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity.15 In his celebrated Free Will Defense, 
Plantinga entertains the possibility that there be some creatures who freely perform at least 
one morally reprehensible action in any possible world in which they exist. Taking this sad 
state of affairs to heart, a Plantingian defender of A1 might entertain the possibility of 
transplanet depravity, where there is at least one bad apple in every alien bunch, as it were, 
so that eventually a fall would occur on every planet where ETI exists.  
We can imagine both possibilities. In the first, where ETI is unfallen but living in a fallen 
world, the assumption ETI need redemption is false, cutting short any argument for (3) which 
depends on it. The incarnation and atonement become terrestrial events that need have no 
implications for ETI. In the second possibility, where transplanet depravity is true, A1 is true. 
If A1 is true, a natural next question is how God redeems ETI, and whether those methods are 
incompatible with received Christian doctrine. So we proceed to A2 and A3 to see if an 
argument for (3) can be made with them. 
 
A2. All fallen intelligent life is saved only via incarnation. 
 
It is true that there are Christian theologians who have argued that the incarnation was 
necessary. Most famously, Anselm in his The Cur Deus Homo argued that only a human can 
atone for human sin. But only God can give a satisfactory payment. Therefore, it was 
necessary that there be a “God-Man,” i.e., that God take on human nature to redeem 
humanity. That which is not assumed is not saved, the idea goes. If there is other ETI that is 
fallen, to save them God will need to assume their nature in like fashion. We will return to 
this thought below. 
But not all Christian theologians agree with Anselm. Augustine, Aquinas and 
Bonaventure all thought that while the incarnation was a particularly fitting means of 
salvation for mankind, it was not necessary.16 In His omnipotent power, God “could have 
restored human nature in many other ways,” says Aquinas (ST III q1, a2). Thus, while we do 
think that out of all the key assumptions A2 is on firmest epistemic grounds, it is by no means 
undeniable for Christians. Conflict, therefore, is not inescapable. But supposing we accept A1 
and A2, going one step further and accepting A3 will, we think, cause conflict. So let us turn 
to A3. 
 
A3. There cannot be multiple incarnations. 
 
The one horn of the dilemma in Paine’s argument ran into the supposed absurdity of Christ 
abandoning ETI by becoming incarnate just on Earth. But if Christ is not to abandon ETI, we 
are gouged by the other horn, where the absurdity is of Christ becoming incarnate on every 
planet with ETI. Both horns therefore assume there cannot be multiple incarnations, either 
simultaneously on more than one planet or successively from one planet to the next. This 
seems to be the central problem, really, and so we’d expect to find A3 in most arguments for 
a conflict between Christian doctrine and the existence of ETI. But is this a safe assumption? 
We think not. In fact, it is the most dubious of the three key assumptions. Much has been 
written about this elsewhere, so we confine ourselves to just a few points in response. 
 
15 See Plantinga (1974), pp. 184ff. 
16 For an application of this point to our current topic by a theologian, see Davison (2018). On necessitarian and 
non-necessitarian theories of the atonement, see Craig (2020), p. 121ff. 
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First, there is a legitimate and strong argument from authority against A3. Aquinas saw 
no difficulty with there being multiple incarnations (ST III q4 a1). The same is true of 
contemporary philosophers who have articulated the most philosophically sophisticated 
models of the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation. In his landmark book The Logic of God 
Incarnate, Thomas Morris argues that “the picture of the Incarnation I have been developing 
will perfectly well allow the possibility of multiple divine incarnations.”17 In God Incarnate: 
Explorations in Christology, Oliver Crisp argues similarly that “there is no metaphysical 
obstacle to God becoming incarnate on more than one occasion.”18 And in his recent In 
Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology, Timothy Pawl argues the point most extensively. 
After defending “an extremely strong view of the possibility of multiple incarnations,” that is, 
Aquinas’ view that God could assume multiple concrete rational natures simultaneously, 
Pawl goes on to argue that all extant objections to the coherence or consistency of that view 
fail.19 In the present context, we can scarcely add to what these philosophers have already 
labored to show. 
Beyond these appeals to authority, we think it is quite easy to see how there can be 
multiple incarnations. What we have in Jesus of Nazareth is the divine mind of the second 
person of the Trinity eclipsed by the assumption of humanity, allowing expression only of 
beliefs and experiences appropriate thereto. Multiple personality disorder (MPD) is 
sometimes invoked to illuminate how Christ could be of two minds, divine and human, in the 
incarnation.20 Some clinicians maintain that in cases of MPD, one person can have multiple 
highly functional “alters”—robustly distinct alternate personalities which may or may not 
overlap. Alters have been said to have their own thoughts, sense of humor, beliefs, feelings, 
skills, memories, mannerisms, fears, voice quality, visual acuity, and even their own 
tolerance to medication and allergic responses.21 We find MPD just as serviceable, if not 
more, in illuminating how Christ could be of more than two minds, one divine and 
indefinitely many other non-divine, in the case of multiple incarnations. Of course, we hasten 
to highlight the obvious point of disanalogy, namely, that such a “condition” would not be for 
the omniscient creator a disorder, but wholly consistent with cognitive perfection. We thus 
agree with Robin Collins that “God’s overall consciousness would not in any way be 
diminished even if God took on an infinite number of finite mental systems, from an infinite 
number of fallen races; in fact, if anything, it would enhance God’s consciousness.”22 
Might it also enhance the world? Alvin Plantinga has argued that possible worlds 
featuring the events of the fall, incarnation, and atonement are better than worlds that don’t. 
 
17 Morris (1986), p. 181. 
18 See Crisp (2009), p. 155. Although for other reasons, Crisp thinks Christ’s terrestrial incarnation is singular 
and unique (see idem., pp. 170ff). More on this below. 
19 Pawl (2019), p. 54. Morris, Crisp, and Pawl all interact with Brian Hebblethwaite’s arguments to the contrary, 
among others’. Pawl also cites Marylyn Adams, Richard Cross, Thomas Flint, Alfred Freddoso, and Gerald 
O’Collins, et al. as defending the possibility of multiple incarnations. That so many philosophers and 
theologians have maintained there is no problem with multiple incarnations makes Hebblethwaite’s and others’ 
objections to the contrary seem rather idiosyncratic. 
20 Or DID (Dissociative Identity Disorder), as it is now called. We stick with “MPD”, as the condition is more 
commonly known. We should also note that we need not assume MPD is real, given that there is debate in the 
psychiatric community over its actual reality. We appeal to it, as others have, as a conceptually coherent 
illustration of how one person could be of more than one mind. 
21 See discussion and references in Braude (1995), ch. 2. 
22 Collins (2015), pp. 218-219. Collins argues it is very likely that there is ETI in great number, since that would 
increase the value of reality in various respects. Collins’ article is also noteworthy for the fact that he considers 
how even a kenotic view of the incarnation is compatible with multiple incarnations (pp. 220-224). We do not 
consider that view here because it is not the traditional Christian view, but if Collins is right, that means there is 
no extant model of the incarnation incompatible with there being multiple incarnations, which is an impressive 
conclusion. 
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The Gospel story, that is, the story of God becoming incarnate, dying a brutal death, and 
resurrecting triumphantly for the eternal salvation of mankind “is not merely the greatest 
story ever told; it is the greatest story that could be told.”23 Therefore all the best possible 
worlds, Plantinga thinks, will contain Gospel events. If the actual world contains Gospel 
events multiple times over on other planets, it would be a very good world, indeed. If this is 
the case, then there would be a priori reason to think God has become or is at least in the 
process of becoming multiply incarnate. The evidence then for thinking that A3 is false is the 
existence of the actual world. If there is evidence to suggest that the actual world possesses or 
will possess multiple Gospel events, then surely it is possible for God to have multiple 
incarnations. 
Let’s say, however, that one isn’t inclined to advance Plantinga’s line of reasoning in this 
way, thinking instead that worlds containing just one suite of Gospel events are superior to, 
or at least equally as good as, worlds containing a plentitude of them. On this view, one could 
hold the Gospel events to be universally effectual, sufficient to redeem all fallen rational 
species that exist. This is, in fact, Oliver Crisp and Jonathan Rutledge’s position. They are 
convinced that the Christian scriptures teach that the work of Jesus of Nazareth on Earth has 
cosmic scope, and so would be sufficient to also atone for any fallen ETI. How is that 
possible if, as we thought earlier, that which is not assumed cannot be saved? Would not 
Christ need to assume each alien nature to save each alien species? Crisp and Rutledge think 
not. As they see it, what it means to be human is to be a rational animal. ETI, then, would be 
no less human than us just in virtue of being rational animals, even if there be stark 
differences in physical features.24 So even if we assume that for God to save a species He 
must assume the nature of that species, if all rational animals are ipso facto human, God need 
only assume a human nature to redeem us and any ETI.25 Thus even if we grant A3 along 
with A1 and A2, giving away the whole store, (3) would still not follow. 
We have argued there is no conflict between the existence of ETI and theism generally, 
the Christian scriptures, and now the central Christian doctrines of the fall, incarnation, and 
atonement.26 But has the church pronounced on the matter, and should Christians be troubled 
by a potential conflict between the existence of ETI and Christian tradition? 
 
23 Plantinga (2011), p. 59. For a fuller treatment of this argument, see also Plantinga (2004). 
24 Crisp (2009) and Rutledge (forthcoming). Crisp and Rutledge disagree about how to understand the 
philosophical anthropology; Crisp prefers a Cartesian view whereas Rutledge prefers what he calls 
“hylemorphic animalism.” Crisp and Rutledge’s view also has the virtue of showing how the existence of ETI 
can be compatible with the doctrine of the imago Dei, supposing what it means to bear the image of God is to be 
a rational, free, moral creature. 
25 O’Connor and Woodward (2015) object to such a view on the grounds that it “suggests that we humans won 
an Incarnational lottery—that we alone, for no apparent reason—were chosen as the recipients of God’s 
incarnational act” (p. 231). Furthermore, they argue, the view raises the thorny question of how ETI would 
become aware, and so avail themselves of, Christ’s redeeming work. These objections, however, do not seem 
insuperable. First, if someone must win the incarnational lottery, why not us? The objection implies that the 
inhabitants of any world in which God becomes incarnate would be unjustified in thinking they won the 
incarnational lottery, which is absurd. Lottery winners are justified in believing they won when they hold the 
winning ticket in their hand! Second, God might have many reasons for selecting us. Perhaps we were the first 
to fall, or for other reasons “the fullness of time had come” for us before others. As for the second objection, see 
the various ways Christ’s work might apply to ETI sketched by Crisp (2009). 
26 Might there be conflict with other Christian doctrines? We don’t see any, but we also don’t know just how 
many Christian doctrines there are, exactly. Limiting consideration to only those which are central to Christian 
belief as outlined in the introduction, we think, is therefore most judicious. Of those, we haven’t considered how 
ETI would fit into the Christian eschaton, the subject of Mark Twain’s satire Extract from Captain Stormfield’s 
Visit to Heaven (we thank Paul Wells for this reference). But again, we don’t see any potential conflict here. On 
the contrary, we find it fun to think about. Would heaven resemble a Star Wars- or Star Trek-like universe full 
of all different manner of intelligent species, or would each species occupy their own realm, rather like how 
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4. Conflict with Tradition 
 
The short answer is simply, No. Pre-rockets, pre-Hubble, indeed, pre-Copernicus there was 
little reason to wonder whether we are alone in the universe, although some did. One of the 
earliest known examples is the fifteenth century Catholic Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, who, in 
his treatise De Docta Ignorantia, entertains with no theological difficulty the idea that in 
every “stellar region” among the uncountably many stars there are “inhabitants, different in 
nature by rank and all owing their origin to God.”27 Others, in the spirit of the Medieval 
dictum bonum est diffusivum sui, argued that God’s goodness implies that He create an 
infinite number of worlds with creatures in them.28 
We therefore find in the Christian tradition a remarkable openness, and in some cases 
outright enthusiasm, about the possibility that there be ETI.29 The present is no exception. 
Billy Graham, for instance, is on record as saying, “I firmly believe there are intelligent 
beings like us far away in space who worship God. But we would have nothing to fear from 
these people. Like us, they are God’s creation.” And when asked about what he’d do if an 
expedition of Martians visited Earth, Pope Francis said he’d baptize them if they were 
willing. “Who are we to close doors?” he asked in return. We speculate that this stance would 
be surprising only to those who have an unduly and often dogmatically narrow conception of 
Christianity, especially the relationship between faith and science. Nothing in the Christian 
tradition enjoins us to believe ETI doesn’t exist. 
 
5. ETI and the Problem of Evil 
 
If there are extraterrestrial intelligent species, then presumably they would also be like us in 
those respects which mean they can suffer: they have bodies, they are self-conscious, and can 
experience physical and emotional pain. So if ETI exists in great number, then presumably 
there is a lot more suffering in our universe than we have imagined. Insofar as suffering 
conflicts with Christian belief, ETI would therefore exacerbate that conflict. We consider two 
ways this conflict might be advanced in argument. 
 
5.1. ETI and Evidential Arguments from Evil 
 
Sam Ruhmkorff has recently argued that the existence of ETI strengthens evidential 
arguments from evil against theism, since the existence of ETI implies a greater distribution 
of good and evil in the universe, including, importantly, evils more severe than we have 
 
Lewis imagines our relationship to Narnia? Would ETI receive their own type of resurrected bodies? If so, 
would Christ be incarnate in each body type simultaneously? 
27 See the full quotation in Weintraub (2014), p. 16. We commend Weintraub for his thorough documentation of 
the various theological perspectives on this throughout history. See also chapters 6 and 7 in O’Meara (2012). 
28 See Weintraub (2014), ch. 2. See also the references in footnote 3. 
29 As one reviewer has brought to our attention, it is sometimes claimed that Giordano Bruno was condemned 
and executed for his belief in many inhabited worlds. This is, however, just another example of hackneyed 
historical revisionism characteristic of pop-level tracts on the alleged conflict between science and religion. 
Shackelford (2009) is a good source here, but even he seems to exaggerate the extent to which Bruno’s belief in 
ETI may have factored into his condemnation, seeing as others (such as Nicholas of Cusa) before him believed 
the same, yet nary a one got so much as singed. Better is Brooke (1991), whose findings are much closer to the 
Catholic Church’s own account, which states that “Bruno was not condemned for his defense of the Copernican 
system of astronomy, nor his doctrine of the plurality of inhabited worlds, but for his theological errors, among 
which were the following: that Christ was not God but merely an unusually skilled magician, that the Holy 
Ghost is the soul of the world, that the Devil will be saved, etc.” See Turner (1908), p. 17.  
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experienced on Earth. He outlines the argument with admirable mathematical precision, but 
the main idea is simply grasped. If a small tribe believed they were the only people on the 
planet, they should think the tallest person in their tribe is the tallest person on the planet. But 
if they learn that there are many other tribes on the planet, they should infer instead that 
there’s probably someone taller elsewhere. By the same reasoning, if there is a lot of ETI, it 
is “very likely that there are evils in the universe significantly worse than the worst evils on 
Earth, as well as goods significantly better than the best goods on Earth.”30 Ruhmkorff 
therefore concludes that “the more intelligent creation there is, the less likely a perfect 
God.”31 
Much of what we have already said is relevant by way of response. But before going any 
further, we cannot but remark on how astonishingly modest Ruhmkorff’s thesis is, contrary to 
what his conclusion suggests. As he makes clear throughout the paper, his thesis is 
conditional: the existence of ETI strengthens certain arguments from evil, “if these arguments 
are cogent in the first place.”32 That is, if you already think the balance of good and evil 
renders God’s existence unlikely, then you should think so all the more if ETI exists. Suffice 
it to say, we do not accept the antecedent of this conditional (nor, we suspect, would most 
theists), making Ruhmkorff’s argument irrelevant to us. 
Ruhmkorff himself acknowledges this last point, as theists who think there is evidence for 
the existence of a good God thereby have “evidence for a constraint on how bad things could 
get in the universe.”33 Christian theists can appeal to more than God’s goodness in the 
abstract, however. As we have argued, if ETI exists, it’s possible that ETI isn’t fallen like we 
are and so would not experience evil and suffering as a consequence thereof. Alternatively, 
we argued, the value of a world in which the Gospel events are true, comprising as it does the 
greatest story that could be told, will be greater than even the greatest of untold evils. 
Whether this story as played out on Earth applies to other worlds where fallen ETI exists, or 
whether it plays out on those worlds in unique fashion, evidence for the truth of Christianity 
is evidence of a universe where good doesn’t merely outweigh evil, but overwhelms it. 
Be that as it may, we are puzzled about why Ruhmkorff thinks his target audience—those 
who already find evidential arguments from evil cogent—should buy his argument. Why, if 
you already think evidential arguments from evil are cogent, should you think they’re 
strengthened if the amount and severity of evil increases in tandem with the amount and 
“severity” of goods? We just don’t see why evil accrues more evidential weight than 
goodness as both are more widely distributed than we thought, so long as they’re distributed 
 
30 Ruhmkorff (2019), p. 300. 
31 Ibid., p. 313. 
32 Ibid., p. 300.  
33 Ibid., p. 312. We relegate to a footnote an even deeper problem with Ruhmkorff’s argument. Ruhmkorff 
appeals to the Copernican principle (i.e., “when we have no information about our position along a given 
dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those 
observers in respect to that dimension”), roughly illustrated in the tallest tribesman example, to get results about 
the likely distribution of evil in the universe. He recognizes that positive evidence for theism would render the 
Copernican principle inapplicable, but we question the applicability of the Copernican principle even in the 
absence of such evidence. Since the correct theory of cosmic origins causally influences the subsequent 
distribution of evil throughout the universe, even if we have no positive evidence for theism, the likely 
distribution of evil still must be evaluated with respect to the intrinsic probability of different versions of theism, 
naturalism, and any other rival theories of cosmic origins. See Climenhaga (2019) on the dependence relations 
that hold among different probabilities. In accordance with the theorem of total probability, the likely 
distribution of evil in the universe is a weighted average of the likely distribution of evil conditional on each of 
these theories, weighted by their intrinsic probabilities. If theism is more intrinsically probable, then evil is more 
likely distributed in the way theism predicts; while if naturalism is more intrinsically probable, then evil is more 
likely distributed in the way naturalism predicts. Hence, the Copernican principle just doesn’t seem to have the 
utility Ruhmkorff thinks it does.  
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equally. If the evidential balance remains constant, so should one’s epistemic appraisal of it. 
But Ruhmkorff seems to assume his target audience should have an asymmetric reaction, 
where they are more horrified by the greater evils than they are appreciative of the greater 
goods. But why assume they should have an asymmetric reaction at all, and why assume it 
goes one way and not the other—that is, why not think they’d be more appreciative of the 
greater goods than they would be horrified of the greater evils, and so take ETI to weaken 
their estimation of arguments from evil?34 For all its technical flashiness, Ruhmkorff’s 
argument seems trivialized by this rather elementary observation. We conclude that 
Ruhmkorff’s argument that the existence of ETI exacerbates the problem of evil is odd on its 
own terms and is irrelevant to our project. 
 
5.2. ETI and the Soteriological Problem of Evil 
 
If the universe contains more creatures who suffer like us in this life, presumably that means 
they can also suffer like us in the next—that is, the existence of ETI might mean that hell 
could be significantly more crowded than we currently think. In this way, it could be argued, 
the existence of ETI exacerbates what has been called the soteriological problem of evil, a 
special case of the problem of evil for Christian theism in particular. Since an essential 
Christian doctrine is that humans are made right with God only by way of Christ’s 
redemptive work (John 14:6), what about all the ETI that never hears (supposing they have 
ears) of Christ and His mission, and so cannot avail themselves of His offer of salvation? If 
we find the doctrine of hell already hard to swallow, adding countless other rational creatures 
to its population may well cause us to choke. 
We don’t find this worry especially troublesome, however, for four reasons. First, recall 
our discussion above with respect to the atonement of Christ. It could be such that Christ’s 
sacrifice on Earth is sufficient to save all persons throughout the universe (or multiverse, if 
there is one). And, while faith in Christ is necessary for salvation, perhaps there are some 
people who have implicit faith in God’s love and forgiveness sufficient for salvation even 
without being explicitly aware of Christ and His accomplishments. Following Karl Rahner, 
we can call them anonymous Christians.35 This is what the Catholic Catechism teaches: 
 
Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, 
but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their 
actions to do his will as they know it through the dictates of their conscience - those too 
may achieve eternal salvation.36 
 
Second, as we argued, it is also possible that God take on multiple incarnations, making a 
unique offer of salvation to each alien race, ensuring none who would accept it would be lost 
by accident of cosmic location. Third, again as we’ve argued, it is also possible that ETI is 
not even fallen and in need of salvation, and therefore in no danger whatever of the eternal 
 
34 In fact, there are reasons to think that, if there is an asymmetric reaction, it would favor greater goods. First, 
although it is an empirical question for investigation, we suspect that for most people intense experience of great 
goods has a greater psychological impact than intense experience of great evils, as evidenced by the many 
people who have found in their experience of God the resources to endure the most horrendous of evils. Second, 
as Ruhmkorff notes, there’s probably a limit to the amount of evil and suffering a person can psychologically 
endure. We note, however, that the reverse does not seem true: there is no limit to the amount of goodness and 
bliss a person can psychologically “endure.” So it’s plausible to us that there are some goods so great that once 
experienced, no amount of evil subsequently experienced could outweigh them. If so, the greater goods to be 
experienced have more evidential weight than the greater evils. 
35 See Rahner (1986). 
36 Flannery (1975), p. 222. 
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fires of hell. Finally, apart from some other reason for thinking a disproportionate number of 
ETI would be destined to hell, all extant proffered solutions to the problem of hell apply 
equally to the broader context that includes ETI.37 The existence of ETI, therefore, does not 
exacerbate the soteriological problem of evil for Christian theism.  
 
6. Narrative Conflict 
 
The existence of ETI, we think, would not conflict with theism or the Christian scriptures, 
central Christian doctrines, tradition, or exacerbate the problem of evil. But because so many 
Christians still find something intuitively disturbing about the prospect of there being ETI, 
we think more needs to be said. Here we push forward to explore what we think could be the 
source any remaining sense of conflict between the existence of ETI and Christian belief. 
As mentioned above, Christianity has been called the greatest story ever told. Setting 
aside the superlative, it is natural to think of Christianity as, in fact, a story of sorts. It is a 
grand narrative about life, the universe, and everything, one that purports to answer such 
questions as those elegantly outlined in the Second Vatican Council: 
 
What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of human life? What is upright 
behavior, and what is sinful? Where does suffering originate, and what end does it 
serve? How can genuine happiness be found? What happens at death? What is 
judgment? What reward follows death? And finally, what is the ultimate mystery, 
beyond human explanation, which embraces our entire existence, from which we take 
our origin and towards which we tend?38 
 
Christianity’s answers to these questions are not disparate and inchoately patched together; 
rather, they form a coherent narrative, complete with a prologue, main characters, a setting, 
conflict, climax, and resolution. There is little doubt that Christianity is intuitively understood 
in this way—as a story—and Christians find the very meaning of their lives in being part of 
it.39 
And so here, finally, we think we encounter a source of potential conflict between the 
existence of ETI and Christian belief. It is conceivable to us that ETI disrupts the Christian 
story, so to speak.40 It would be quite jarring, for example, if UFOs started appearing in the 
sky at the denouement of the cinematic masterpiece The Shawshank Redemption, although 
there is nothing in the film up to that point suggesting aliens don’t exist. We submit that it is 
a conflict of this sort—or better, tension—that is really the issue when it comes to Christian 
belief and the existence of ETI. The existence of ETI would come as a major shock to 
Christians, because heretofore ETI simply didn’t enter into the story about life, the universe, 
and everything that they took to be complete. ETI would, at the very least, entail that that 
story was radically incomplete. More extreme, the existence of ETI might cause some to 
think we’re living in an entirely different story altogether. It would be akin to either a major 
unforeseen plot twist, or swapping one book for another one. 
 
37 On which see Walls (1992) and Manis (2019). 
38 Flannery (1975), p. 738. 
39 For a very nice statement and defense of this, see Seachris (2016) and Ganssle (2017). 
40 Although above we used Paine’s argument as a springboard for considering potential doctrinal conflict, he 
also seemed to have what we’re calling narrative conflict in mind. The beginning of the paragraph we quoted 
above reads: “Though there is not a direct article of the Christian system, that this world that we inhabit is the 
whole of the habitable creation, yet it is so worked up therewith, from what is called the Mosaic account of the 
Creation, the story of Eve and the apple, and the counterpart of that story, the death of the Son of God, that to 
believe otherwise, that is, to believe that God created a plurality of worlds, at least as numerous as what we call 
stars…”. Paine (A), p. 42. 
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The extent to which ETI disrupts the Christian story—and, accordingly, the depth of 
tension between the two—will depend on whether and how ETI interacts with us humans. 
We take the following five scenarios to represent increasing levels of tension: 
 
S1. ETI is so remote or undetectable that any interaction is (nomologically) impossible. 
S2. ETI is so remote as to be physically inaccessible, but communication is possible.  
S3. Physical interaction with ETI is possible; ETI is peaceable. 
S4. Physical interaction with ETI is possible; ETI is hostile but not an existential threat. 
S5. Physical interaction with ETI is possible; ETI is hostile and an existential threat. 
 
The first scenario disrupts the Christian story hardly at all, if at all. In S1, ETI would pose 
little more than the theological curiosities not unlike those already explored above. The 
theological curiosities turn concerning in S2 and S3 in tandem with the level of interaction, 
and some narrative tension begins to emerge: where do ETI fit into the Christian story? Do 
we have to rethink certain parts of it and our centrality to it? Concern turns to genuine alarm 
in S4, and in S5 the tension seems intractable. Consideration of hostile Earth invasion 
scenarios, as depicted in H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds and Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s 
Game, or in the films Independence Day and Signs, are vivid depictions of the tension. 
Indeed, such scenarios would constitute so radical a plot twist that we’d need reason to 
believe we’re still in the same story. What we’d need is, in effect, a theodicy—a hostile ETI 
theodicy, let’s call it. Sans a hostile ETI theodicy, scenarios like S4 and S5 would threaten to 
turn the greatest story ever told into a cosmic-scale M. Night Shyamalan box office flop.  
 
6.1. Hostile ETI Theodicies 
 
But we must be careful. A successful hostile ETI theodicy is not merely one that adduces 
possible goods that would counterbalance the suffering that would result from an S5-like 
event. Not only would extant theodicies (e.g., soul-making) still be relevant to that task, it’s 
almost trivially easy to think of new ones more suited to the context. Perhaps the existential 
threat to humanity posed by ETI would reveal, once and for all, how petty are our own 
differences which have driven us visit war upon each other. Or perhaps ETI would bring 
technology that is the key to solving the world’s (alleged) energy crisis, or poverty and 
hunger, leading to unprecedented human flourishing. Perhaps we are apprised of such alien 
technology just in time to escape the heat death of the sun, securing the future of humanity 
elsewhere in the universe. These possibilities aside, what we will regard as a successful 
hostile ETI theodicy is one that also alleviates the narrative tension between Christianity and 
an S5-like event. Three examples in fiction come to mind. 
1. Mel Gibson’s movie Signs features a small-town priest struggling with doubt after the 
unexpected loss of his wife in a tragic car accident, leaving him and his failed baseball player 
of a brother to care for his young mysophobic daughter and severely asthmatic son. These 
burdens turn out to be the precise confluence of conditions necessary for the family to survive 
the alien invasion. Every “burden” finds its reason in God’s undeniable providence within a 
harrowing 48-hour period, foreshadowed by his wife’s dying words. After the aliens 
disappear just as mysteriously as they arrived, the priest reexamines his doubts about the 
existence of a sovereign, loving God. Here we see the narrative tension between an S5-like 
event and Christianity alleviated by having the alien invasion itself being situated within an 
anthropocentric context, where God’s meticulous providence, bringing goodness out of 
suffering, and maintaining faith in the midst of doubt remain central themes. 
2. Our second example comes from Orson Scott Card’s series of novels about protagonist 
Ender Wiggin. The story begins with an S5-like event, and the heroic deeds of a few, 
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including Ender, save humanity from extinction. The secret to Ender’s success was 
understanding Earth’s enemies deeply enough to love them. Ender goes on to be something 
of an intergalactic priest, acting as a spiritual liaison between humanity and alien species, but 
also between the alien species and God. Many humans come to believe that alien species, too, 
are God’s creatures and deserve to be loved and respected as such, and are no less in need of 
salvation. In this example, the narrative tension posed by the original S5-like event is 
resolved by situating what we took to be the whole story about God and creatures into a much 
larger story, one where the great Christian truths extend beyond the ends of the Earth to the 
entire cosmos “as far as the curse is found.” 
3. The third and final example comes from Mary Doria Russell’s The Sparrow, where 
humans initiate contact with ETI after discovering a musical signal emanating from a 
neighboring solar system. A group of Jesuit missionaries resolve to make contact “that they 
might come to know and love God’s other children.” All the missionaries but one, Father 
Sandoz, meet a tragic fate, some at the hands of alien species. Sandoz is eventually rescued 
by another mission, but lives the rest of his life trying to make sense of it all. Despite having 
endured immense suffering through the ordeal, he grows closer to God, so close that a fellow 
Jesuit says he hasn’t even the courage to envy him. We see in this tragic tale familiar themes 
of holding fast in the midst of suffering, trust in the providence of God, and sharing in God’s 
love for all of creation, including ETI. But unlike the previous examples, there is no special 
“moral of the story,” except perhaps that the existence of ETI doesn’t change much of 
anything. It turns out that questions about life, meaning, God, suffering, faith and doubt are 
the same on Rakhat, the alien planet, as they are here on Earth. But if the questions are the 
same, so too are the answers—answers which form the Christian narrative. 
This last example we find particularly insightful, since it seems most realistic. We already 
have in our own terrestrial history examples of Christians encountering peoples who, from 
their perspective, seemed as different from them as we imagine ETI might be from us. In the 
event of encountering ETI, is the theology all that different from when Spanish explorers 
ventured to “new worlds” and first encountered South American natives? No doubt they 
wondered how such peoples fit into the Christian story, yet in retrospect it’s hard to conceive 
of how it could have been told any other way. Think of your favorite movie or novel or 
painting. The longer and closer you attend to its details, the more you learn from it, the richer 
it becomes. But it doesn’t change. How much more might we expect that of a work of divine 
origin, of the greatest story that could be told? 
It’s fascinating to us that there are so many works of fiction which explore the 
relationship between faith and the existence of ETI. In fact, we aren’t aware of a single 
example where the existence of ETI is presented as incompatible with traditional religious 
belief. On the contrary, all the works we’re aware of acknowledge their compatibility, either 
implicitly (e.g., scenes of Jewish prayer in Independence Day, and Catholic prayer in Close 
Encounters of the Third Kind) or explicitly in the form of a hostile ETI theodicy, as seen in 
the three examples discussed above. We choose these three examples because they represent 
different forms a hostile ETI theodicy might take. We see in the first example how the 
narrative tension between an S5-like event and the Christian story is alleviated by subsuming 
the former into the latter. In the second example, the latter is expanded in light of the former. 
And finally in the third we see how the existence of ETI could result in no relevant change to 
the Christian story at all. 
Were an S5-like event to actually occur, there’s no telling how the particulars would 
unfold. But we are confident that however it would, the seeds of a successful hostile ETI 
theodicy would be it sown in it—that is, the event could easily be situated within the 
Christian story (example 1), the Christian story would expand in a way that includes such an 
event (example 2), or there’d be no dramatic change in our understanding of the Christian 
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story at all (example 3). What justifies our confidence in this? Easy: we have independent 
justification for our belief that Christianity is true.41 
 
6.2. Divine Deception? 
 
Christianity, we’ve suggested, is a narrative. Narratives have narrators, or authors. The 
Apostle Peter refers to Christ as the author of life (Acts 3:15). However dramatic a plot twist 
an S5-like event would seem to us to be, we would still regard God as its author. But plot 
twists trade on surprise, and sometimes outright deception. Would the surprise of an S5-like 
event make God, the author of life as we understood it up to that point, a deceiver? The God 
of the Christian scriptures is full of surprises. There are even instances where God acts in 
deceitful ways, and praises acts of deception.42 That may sound damning, but a moment’s 
reflection reveals that not all deception is morally wrong. Many jokes rely on deception, as 
do many sports and, indeed, good stories. The question before us, then, is whether an S5-like 
event would constitute a morally blameworthy act of deception on God’s part. And we don’t 
think so.43 
We acknowledge that the ethics of lying and deception are subtle, and so we hope the 
reader will pardon our brevity here. But plausibly, for S to be morally blameworthy for 
deceiving S*, S must intentionally distort S*’s understanding of reality in a context where S* 
doesn’t deserve that. Cleary, putting on a poker face to protect your winning hand is not 
morally equivalent to putting on a poker face to authorities to protect your stolen goods. The 
former is innocuous. The latter is blameworthy. Indeed, we find nothing wrong with putting 
on a poker face to protect stowaway Jews from Gestapo inquiries (cf. the praise James and 
the author of Hebrews gives Rahab for her actions in Joshua 2). 
Applied to the present topic, we set aside the questions of whether God owes His creation 
anything, and whether entertaining counterpossibles is legitimate. The question is, Would the 
context immediately prior to an S5-like event (which we assume would be like our present 
context in all relevant respects) be one in which God intentionally distorted our 
understanding of reality about the possibility of such an event, even though we didn’t deserve 
that? Framed this way, we don’t see how God could be guilty of that. As we’ve argued, 
there’s nothing in Christian scripture, doctrine, or tradition incompatible with the existence of 
ETI, or the possibility of an S5-like event. And in the preceding section, we argued that 
hostile ETI theodicies show how such an event is not just compatible but possibly consonant 
with the Christian story. We therefore conclude that should an S5-like event occur, as 
surprising as that would be for us, it would not constitute a blameworthy act of deception on 




We have argued that there is no conflict between the existence of ETI and Christian belief. 
One question we are still left with, however, is this: if ETI exists, why would God not have 
 
41 On arguments for the existence of God, see Swinburne (2004), Craig and Moreland (2012), Walls and 
Dougherty (2018), and McIntosh (2019). On arguments for the resurrection of Jesus, see Craig (2002), 
Swinburne (2003), Licona (2010), and McGrew and McGrew (2012). On how Christian belief can be warranted 
even apart from arguments, see Plantinga (2000) and McNabb (2018). 
42 See for example Exodus 1:15-21; 1 Samuel 16:1-5; Judges 4:17-21; Luke 24:28; 1 Corinthians 2:8, 2 
Thessalonians 2:11, and so on. 
43 Perhaps rather than being worried about God’s goodness and its compatibility with divine deception, you 
detect a certain epistemic tension: if God can permissibly deceive us, how do we know God isn’t deceiving us 
about Christianity being true? For addressing an epistemic concern relating to divine deception, see Baldwin and 
McNabb (2019) and Hendricks (2020). 
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specially revealed this to us? We’ve argued that it’s false to think God should have, as if we 
would have been wrongfully deceived otherwise. But we might still wonder why He didn’t.44 
Once again, the question becomes more pressing as we go from an S1-like event up to an S5-
like event. If ETI is so remote or undetectable that any interaction is impossible, the question 
of why God didn’t reveal their existence to us is a mere theological curiosity. But if ETI 
shows up tomorrow with their mysterious lights in the sky and unknown intentions, throwing 
Earth into chaos, the question is downright haunting. Without an answer to serve as a dike 
against the flood of uncertainty, doubt, and feelings of abandonment that such an event would 
bring, many Christians, we guess, would be overwhelmed and lose faith. 
But we think this emotional reaction, while understandable, would be philosophically and 
theologically unjustified. After all, would those lights in the sky affect the soundness of 
arguments for the existence of God, in particular, arguments for the existence of a morally 
perfect creator? And would they change the reality that our own moral shortcomings create a 
seemingly unbreachable gulf between ourselves and such a being, and the need for a bridge 
to span that gulf—one that has us at one end and God at the other? Would they upend the 
historical evidence that God became for us that bridge in Christ, who conquered the grave as 
confirmation? Would they undermine our experience of the divine, or our assurance that the 
Gospel events are true? Obviously not. But those lights sure would be unsettling, to say the 
least. The proper response, then, would not be to lose faith, but to “be strong and courageous. 
Do not fear or be in dread of them, for it is the Lord your God who goes with you; He will 
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